Are the British intelligence and security agencies democratically accountable?

Posted on September 7, 2015 by Andrew Defty

MI6 FlagThe following essay by first year politics student, Thomas Eason, was winner of the 2015 University of Lincoln School of Social and Political Sciences prize (sponsored by Oxford University Press) for the best first year essay in politics and international relations.

The British Intelligence and Security Services consist of three agencies all of which are operating for the government each with significant power that is largely utilised covertly. The three main agencies consist of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) which deals with Britain’s political and economic interests abroad (Jones and Norton, 2014, 495), Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) which operates to gather intelligence through interception of communications (Cabinet Office, 2010, 8) and the Security Service (MI5) which is responsible for protecting the UK against covertly organised threats to national security including terrorism, espionage and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Cabinet Office, 2010, 10). Due to the sensitive nature of the British intelligence services they inevitably need the powers necessary to operate secretly and effectively against enemies of the state (Budge et al, 2001, 536). This mixture of power and secrecy raises questions as to just how accountable this secret arm of the government really is. This is because under a democracy all branches of the state should be publicly accountable (Budge et al, 2001, 536).

It is important in a democratic society that there are effective safeguards and means of overseeing the work of the secret intelligence agencies with clearly defined political accountability for their activities (Cabinet Office, 2010, 27). Historically intelligence and security matters within the UK have not been subject to parliamentary scrutiny or debate (Bochel et al, 2010, 483-487). However more recently there has been a rise in more formal ways of subjecting the intelligence services to public accountability (Moran, 2011, 418). Democratic oversight has to focus on two key areas, it should make the intelligence agencies more accountable and it must regulate the covert relationship between the agencies and the executive to prevent abuses (McDonald, 2014).

Accountability and oversight is provided in three ways: through Ministers who are accountable to Parliament for the activities of the agencies, through Parliament itself to provide politically independent oversight of agency activity and through the independent commissioners who provide judicial oversight of the agencies with particular regard to warrants. The commissioners also work with an Investigatory Powers Tribunal that investigates complaints by individuals about the agencies’ conduct towards them (Cabinet Office, 2010, 27). This essay will investigate if the British intelligence and security services are democratically accountable under the three methods of accountability that are currently used in the United Kingdom and will argue that while the intelligence and security agencies are democratically accountable under the current system, this is in a very limited and constrained sense.

Ministerial oversight is one method of ensuring the intelligence agencies are democratically accountable. Ministers not only give instructions to the agency heads they also answer to Parliament for any issues regarding the intelligence agencies. The Foreign Secretary is answerable to Parliament for the work of MI6 and GCHQ while the Home Secretary is answerable to Parliament for issues regarding MI5 (Cabinet Office, 2010, 7-11). The Prime Minister has overall responsibility for intelligence and security matters and thus he is accountable to Parliament for matters affecting intelligence collectively (Cabinet Office, 2010, 16). Ministers being accountable to Parliament on behalf of the agencies ensures that not only are the Ministers monitoring the activities of the agencies but they are also allowing some level of Parliamentary scrutiny with Ministers acting as a conduit between the agencies and Parliament.

Due to the fact the intelligence services work under the authority of Ministers while under the control of their Directors (Leigh, 2009) each Director must provide annual reports on the work of their services to the Prime Minister and their Secretary of State (Cabinet Office, 2010, 16) this ensures the intelligence agencies are watched over by an elected representative providing some level of democratic accountability. The Secretaries of State are responsible for signing warrants for the relevant agencies to authorise them to intercept communications and conduct surveillance operations. This ensures the major decisions are taken by a high ranking elected representative accountable to Parliament, it also ensures the Secretaries of State are informed about the operations the intelligence agencies are conducting.

However, arguing democratic accountability is provided because Minsters oversee the intelligence agencies assumes Ministers take an active role in scrutinising the work of their agencies just as it also assumes Parliament will be interested in scrutinising the Ministers regarding the agencies. Historically this has not been the case, Parliament has not always taken an interest in the work of the agencies and it is unclear that Ministers were much more attentive (Bochel et al, 2014, 36). Some Ministers found the business of dealing with the intelligence agencies distasteful and have kept them at arms length (Bochel et al, 2014, 37). This indicates that Ministers my fail to provide democratic accountability because they do not adequately scrutinise the work of the intelligence agencies they instruct.

Another problem associated with relying on Ministers to scrutinise their intelligence agencies is that the executive, which uses and instructs the agencies, is also responsible for scrutinising them thus creating a democratic deficit. There is a strong suspicion that governments have sometimes enforced secrecy not in the public interest (Budge et al, 2001, 540). To ensure democratic accountability the covert relationship between the executive and these agencies must be scrutinised to prevent abuse (McDonald, 2014).

The democratic deficit from Ministerial oversight and potential for abuse of the intelligence agencies by the executive has lead to the creation of a committee of Parliament called the Intelligence and Security Committee. This committee provides Parliamentary oversight over MI6, GCHQ and MI5 consisting of nine parliamentarians from across political parties (Cabinet Office, 2010, 29). The committee members are nominated by the Prime Minister and are appointed by the Houses of Parliament (Intelligence and Security Committee, 2013). Under recent changes the Committee reports to the Prime Minister and directly to Parliament after their reports have been censored to maintain secrecy (Mullin, 2013). This provides a level of democratic accountability as the agencies are exposed to Parliamentarians who can investigate and oversee different aspects of the expenditure, administration and policy of the three agencies (Cabinet Office, 2010, 29)

Allowing Parliamentarians to oversee the Intelligence Agencies through the Intelligence and Security Committee has exposed intelligence agency staff to the democratic process in a way that has never occurred in the past (Bochel et al, 2014, 75). The Intelligence and Security Committee not only provides a level of accountability by opening the intelligence agencies to scrutiny from Parliamentarians (and by extension parliament) but it also ensures accountability is not just provided by the Ministers that use the agencies.

However, while Ministers might not be members of the Intelligence and Security Committee a large number of MPs question the calibre of the appointments to the Intelligence and Security Committee, with a large number of appointees being ex-Ministers. This raises questions as it means that people who once authorised and oversaw the agencies in a Ministerial position are now overseeing them in the Intelligence and Security Committee. Thus they may be less willing to ask difficult questions that could cause problems for agency heads or the Ministers in government, this may limit the true level of oversight and democratic accountability it provides.

The committee could also limit Parliamentary accountability by posing as an obstruction to other Paramilitary committees (Andrew et al, 2009, 344). This has historically been the case for example when the Foreign Affairs Committee undertook an inquiry looking into the events in Sierra Leone the Foreign Secretary refused to allow the heads of MI6 to appear before the committee stating the Intelligence and Security Committee was appropriate to examine the work of the Secret Intelligence Service (Bochel et al, 2014, 113). This suggests the Intelligence and Security Committee has prevented wider democratic accountability by blocking select committee investigations.

The third method used to oversee the intelligence and security agencies is through the Intelligence Services Commissioner, the Interception of Communications Commissioner and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (Cabinet Office, 2010, 32-31). Both Commissioners are required to have held high judicial office indicating they are expected to have strong knowledge of judicial and legal proceedings. This provides a level of accountability which is separate from Parliament ensuring there is a greater distinction between the people who use or have used the intelligence agencies and the people who provide oversight. The Commissioners and Tribunal also protects the intelligence agencies from becoming completely politicised.

The Intelligence Service Commissioner reviews the warrants signed by the relevant Secretaries of State as well as authorisations for operations (Cabinet Office, 2010, 31). The Interception of Communications Commissioner reviews the issue of warrants permitting the interception of mail and telecommunications by the intelligence and security agencies as well as procedures for how this material is handled (Cabinet Office, 2010, 31). The commissioners are able to visit the agencies to discuss any case they wish in more detail, they must also be given access to whatever documents and information they need. The Commissioners only consider warrants however therefore they are unlikely to identify any illegal conduct by the agencies. This could lead to questions about if the Commissioners really provide accountability or if they are just an excuse to prevent any wider accountability being implemented outside of Parliament.

At the end of each reporting year the Commissioners submit reports to the Prime Minister that are subsequently laid before Parliament and published (Cabinet Office, 2010, 31). In these reports the Commissioner registers the number of warrants issued in a confidential annex while openly recording the number of complaints investigated and the number upheld following the investigation (Andrew et al, 2009, 341). One criticism of these reports however is they often contain very little substance with the Commissioners only reviewing a limited number of warrants.

The Commissioners assist the Investigatory Powers Tribunal which investigates complaints by individuals about the agencies conduct towards them or about interception of their communications (Cabinet Office, 2010, 32). If the Tribunal upholds a complaint it has the power to order action as it sees fit including to award damages to the complaint (Cabinet Office, 2010, 32). The Investigatory Powers Tribunal provides a limited mechanism to not only hold the intelligence agencies to account but also to provide justice to those mistreated by the agencies. The tribunal operates in secret thus its decisions are bared from judicial review. This means its decisions can not be investigated in real detail to see just how fair, balanced and effective it is in its operation.

It is clear that striking a balance between security, liberty and accountability will continue to present a major challenge for the government (Heffernan et al, 2011) particularly with regard to the secret intelligence agencies. While there is a need for secrecy due to the nature of their work, there is also a need for democratic accountability to ensure the agencies and the executive that wields them are not using them in a way that compromises democratic principles. At present the British intelligence and security agencies are accountable using three methods of oversight each with the aim of ensuring democratic accountability. It is clear that these methods of accountability do provide oversight for the intelligence agencies with some arguing that the simple existence of institutions such as the Intelligence and Security Committee are enough to cause the agencies to reflect on proposed actions in advance of undertaking them (Heffernan, 2011, 353). However all of these mechanisms have significant weaknesses which could undermine the extent to which they hold the intelligence and security agencies to account. This indicates that while the agencies are democratically accountable it is only to a limited extent with Britain being unusually secretive by Western Standards (Budge et al, 2001, 536).

References

Andrew, C., Aldrich R.J. and Wark, W.K. (2009) Secret Intelligence a reader. Abingdon: Routledge.

Bochel, H., Defty, A. and Dunn, A. (2010) Scrutinising the secret state: parliamentary oversight of the intelligence and security agencies. Policy & Politics, 38(3) 483-487.

Bochel, H., Defty, A. and Kirkpatrick, J. (2014) Watching the Watchers Parliament and the Intelligence Services. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Budge, I., Crewe, I., McKay, D. and Newton, K. (2001) The New British Politics. 2nd Edition. Essex: Pearson.

Cabinet Office. (2010) National Intelligence Machinery.

Intelligence and Security Committee. (2013) Intelligence and security committee of parliament: committee members.

Jones, B. and Norton, P. (2014) Politics UK. 8th Edition. Abingdon: Routledge.

Leigh, I. (2009) Changing the rule of the game: some necessary legal reforms to the United Kingdom intelligence. Review of International Studies, 35(4) 943-955.

McDonald, K. (2014) Proper Parliamentary oversight of the security services is desperately needed.  London: The London School of Economics and Political Science.

Moran, M. (2011) Politics and Governance in the UK. 2nd Edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mullin, C. (2013) Can the security and intelligence services answer the accountability question?. [online] The Guardian.

Heffernan, R., Cowley, P. and Hay, C. (2011) Developments in British politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Coffee & chocolates: covering the general election as a politics academic

Posted on May 12, 2015 by Andrew Defty

Election nights are tiring events for politicians and broadcasters, and for politics academics too.

The requests start coming in a couple of weeks before polling day. I’ve commented on the previous two general elections on BBC Radio Lincolnshire, but the first request comes from Estuary TV in Grimsby, a local TV station broadcasting to Lincolnshire and East Yorkshire. They initially want to run the programme through the night but to my relief push this back to 6 – 8am on the morning after the election. Siren FM, a community radio station based at the University of Lincoln are running a programme through the night and I agree to do the first couple of hours from 10 until midnight. I suspect, wrongly as it transpires, that there will be little to report. Finally, BBC Radio Lincolnshire ask if I can sit in on their programme from 10 until midday on Friday morning.

One of the local ITV news programmes later asks if I can help with their blog through election night and appear on their TV news programmes on Friday afternoon. They offer to send a car and put me up in a hotel in Leeds. I tell them I can do Friday afternoon, but have other commitments over election night, and they manage to find someone else who can cover both. I suspect the university press office would prefer me to do the TV work but I’m reluctant to let down those to whom I’ve made commitments. Moreover, I quite like the idea of getting a perspective on the election from two marginal seats, Grimsby and Lincoln, and I live between them so I might get to spend at least part of the night at home. Estuary TV have also said they’re putting me on a panel with the outgoing Labour MP, Austin Mitchell. If UKIP take his seat, and they very well might, I’m keen to know what he thinks.

I’ve done a fair amount of media work before, mainly local press and radio. I’ve covered elections, political resignations and voting in the Eurovision song contest. The role of the politics academic in these circumstances is either to offer a quick, and not too involved, comment on recent events, or to sit in the studio and answer questions on a developing situation. In both cases it is important to be able to put events in context, to offer perspective and detail (although not too much) rather than just comment. This does involve some preparation. For most of the last week I’ve camped on Twitter and read the numerous excellent political blogs. In anticipation of another hung parliament I’ve read extensively about the procedures for the formation of coalition governments and the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act. I type up some notes, I don’t generally need these, but I know that without any sleep I might easily forget the size of Ed Balls majority.

I’ve been following the local seats pretty closely anyway but I draw up a list of key seats to watch, prominent MPs who may lose their seats and key marginals which might indicate the fate of the main parties. There are also a number of seats with particular interest, a number of our students are standing in the local elections and one of last year’s politics and international relations graduates, Andrea Jenkyns, is standing for the Conservatives against Ed Balls in Morley and Outwood. The chances of her unseating Balls are slim, and I’ve told her so. Indeed, we have a little wager, if she wins she’s promised to invite me for dinner at the House of Commons, but I can pay, so I’m keen to see how she gets on.

I’m already yawning as I walk across the railway bridge to the Siren FM studio, it’s not a good sign. The election programme goes on air at 10pm just as the results of the exit poll come in. The poll wakes me up immediately, if it’s accurate then all the preceding polls and forecasts are wrong and it’s unlikely that Cameron will need to form a coalition. It fundamentally changes the evening and I tweet that I’m quietly tearing up my notes in the Siren FM studio. The poll sets the tone for the rest of the show, which is fortunate, as aside from explaining Sunderland South’s obsession with being the first constituency to declare, there is usually little else to report in the first two hours after the polls close on election night. For a small community radion station Siren FM have put on an impressive programme with reporters stationed at the counts in Lincoln, Boston & Skegness and Louth & Horncastle. I’m also asked to contribute to the Lincoln School of Journalism’s live TV coverage of the election.

Before I head home I call in at the Students’ Union where some of my colleagues and our students are watching the results programmes on the TV. Some, although by no means all, are already looking a little deflated. Regrettably I can’t join them for the beer I so desperately want, as I’m driving home and then onto Grimsby later, but I do manage to track down some more coffee.

The dog and the cat look somewhat confused when I arrive home a short while later, but seem grateful for the company as I try to catch up with events on the TV. I watch Labour’s Douglas Alexander and Jim Murphy and a succession of Liberal Democrats lose their seats from the comfort of my own sofa.

I arrive at the studios of Estuary TV at around 5.30am. I’m on a panel with the retiring Labour MP for Grimsby, Austin Mitchell, the Conservative Peer and fellow politics academic, Lord Norton of Louth, and the business editor of the Grimsby Evening Telegraph. At one point a message comes in from one of the viewers that we’re just a bunch of middle-aged white men talking about politics, which is absolutely right, and for some on the panel something of a compliment. I haven’t done much TV work before. I’m conscious that I’m wearing jeans, they’re black and reasonably smart, but everyone else is wearing a suit. I had assumed that we would be sitting behind a desk, but it’s breakfast TV and we are, of course, sitting on sofas. I tuck my shirt in.

The two-hour show goes remarkably quickly. Austin Mitchell is, as always, good value and far from retiring. Philip Norton is on hand to explain the implications of the Fixed Term Parliaments Act, as I knew he would. We agree that the most significant thing about the election, particularly in the Lincolnshire/Humberside area is that there has been very little change. UKIP failed to take target seats Grimsby and Boston & Skegness. The Conservatives have hung onto all of their seats in the region, despite stiff challenges from Labour in Cleethorpes and Lincoln.

I hear about Ed Balls’ defeat sitting in the car park at Grimsby. This is the election’s Portillo moment, people will be talking about where they were when they heard about the Shadow Chancellor’s defeat, but for me I know I’ll remember where I was when I heard that Andrea Jenkyns had been elected.

At 9am I am eating breakfast in Macdonald’s in Lincoln. I tweet that I am on my way to my third media engagement and some kind individual at BBC Radio Lincolnshire replies that they’ll put the coffee on. The kindness continues when I arrive, they give me coffee and chocolates, and arrange Wifi so that I can continue following events on my IPad. In the studio Melvyn Prior refers to me as his ‘election buddy’, which is nice.

Nevertheless, I am clearly tired and despite an hour of Radio 4 in the car between Grimsby and Lincoln, I worry that I’m not up to speed. I’m supposed to be talking about the results of the local elections which also took place yesterday but I haven’t had time to catch up with the results and several are not yet in anyway. When the results for Boston Borough Council come in and show that the Conservatives and UKIP are tied on 13 seats, I point out that this is not very surprising and UKIP might have been expected to do better. During the next record, the producer points out that UKIP previously held no seats on the council. I’m on for two hours so there is plenty of time to clarify my comments by noting that UKIP had won almost all of the seats in Boston in the county council elections in 2013 and had just run the Conservatives a close second in the parliamentary election in the constituency, but it is a reminder that I need to think before I speak.

The rest of the show goes well. The coffee flows, listeners call in with their take on last night’s results and then a succession of resignations by Farage, Clegg and then Miliband ensure that we don’t just spend the show discussing the results. I caution that this is not the first time that Farage has stood down as leader of UKIP and we should not be surprised if we see him back again.

I arrive home at around 2pm. I’ve spent a large part of the last the last 16 hours talking about polls and forecasts, marginal seats and the voting system, but it is only when I get home that I’m able to think about what the election means to me personally. My wife has left a note saying how she feels betrayed by her fellow countrymen and suggesting we move to France for the next five years. My emotions are mixed. I’m deeply disappointed and more than a little confused by the result. I’m also irritated that I will need to rewrite almost all of my first year politics lectures. But I’m also proud that so many of our students have been involved in the election, as candidates and activists, on behalf a range of parties. For most, this has been their ‘first’ general election campaign and I know that some of them will be bitterly disappointed, while others will be euphoric and perhaps a little relieved.

I think I owe Andrea Jenkyns dinner.

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If you want to increase student voting hold elections on a Tuesday in November (between 1 and 3 in the afternoon)

Posted on May 5, 2015 by Andrew Defty

I have often pondered when is the optimum time to deliver a class in order to maximise student attendance. After careful consideration I have come to the conclusion that it is sometime just after lunch on a Tuesday. I wonder if the same principles might be applied in order to maximise student turnout in elections.

In my experience Tuesday is the day of the week on which students are most likely to appear in class and by extension in the polling booth. Mondays and Fridays are clearly to be avoided, a proportion of students each week will choose to spend their weekends away from their place of study, visiting home, partners or friends  in other parts of the UK and beyond. Many will choose to make it a long weekend by leaving early on a Friday and/or postponing their return until a Monday.

Wednesday is also problematic. In most UK universities Wednesday afternoon is set aside for non-teaching activities by sports teams, societies and so forth. These activities can often spillover into Wednesday morning, particularly if, for example, the university tiddlywinks team has to travel to an away match in some far flung corner of the UK. Moreover, if Wednesday afternoon activities are successful this can prompt a degree of celebration on a Wednesday evening which can also impact on Thursday’s attendance.

Of course many students, and not just those undertaking sporting activities, are well known for combining their studies with a certain amount of social interaction. In most university cities in the UK students’ unions and local clubs will set aside one night during the week as a ‘student night.’ Teaching staff quickly learn when this is by the rows of bleary-eyed faces and empty seats in any class the morning after. For the reasons explained above, student nights do not usually take place on a weekend. However, they are also rarely on a Monday, with Wednesdays and Thursdays being the most common, by which time most students presumably feel they have completed a significant proportion of their week’s work and deserve a night out.

Which leaves Tuesday as the day on which students are least likely to be distracted by other preoccupations.

There is also the question of when is the optimum time of day for the polls to open. As anyone who has taught at nine in the morning will be acutely aware, opening polling stations early in the morning will have little impact on student turnout. Indeed it is apparent that some students are almost nocturnal and opening polling booths from 10 in the evening until 7 the morning would therefore be the most effective way of increasing the student vote. However, if one does not want to impose this on the rest of the country I do believe there is a window of opportunity, not too early in the morning, and not too late to impinge on other activities, sometime shortly after lunch,  say from 1pm until 3pm on a Tuesday when most students might be expected to vote. Moreover, given that some students will inevitably claim that they are unable to vote because that is the one time in the week when they are able to attend classes, it might be a good idea if universities cancelled all classes for those two hours on polling day.

Consideration might also be given to changing the electoral calendar. Elections in the UK have generally been held in spring, and the month of May in particular, to take advantage of good weather and light nights while avoiding obvious holiday periods. The timing of general elections has now been fixed in May under the terms of the Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011. However, this does not fit well with university calendars. In May most students at UK universities are in the middle of exams. They are rightly preoccupied with their studies and in many cases return home to revise away from the distractions of university life. This is not the ideal time to expect them to find their polling station and go out and vote.

In contrast, it is well known that students’ willingness to engage in new activities peaks shortly after arriving at university in the autumn term. It is at this time that students sign up to numerous societies (some of which they will never attend), agree to represent their peers on staff-student committees and form new friendships some of which will endure for the rest of their lives, while others will not make it past Freshers’ week. Returning students also often begin each university year with a new found commitment to their studies and a raft of good intentions. Holding elections in the autumn is therefore perhaps the best time to ensure students both register to vote and then actually vote. Some time in late October, before the clocks go back, might be effective, although this perhaps leaves too little time for voter registration. Early November might be preferable. US Presidential elections take place on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November, and this might be an appropriate example to follow, and may help those (engineering) students who don’t understand why we don’t get to vote when the rest of America does.

Of course holding elections in November does hold out the prospect that turnout will be affected by the weather. The UK crime commissioner elections were held in November 2011 and received the lowest turnout of any UK election, which some attributed to the timing of the election. However, research undertaken in Sweden has found little correlation between the weather, and particularly rainfall, and electoral turnout. Moreover, in the UK while temperatures are often lower in November than in May, there is often less rain. Indeed, in six of the last ten years there has been less rainfall in November than in May, unless of course, one is studying in Manchester when the rain will, of course, continue as a background drizzle all year round.

It may then be possible to increase student turnout simply by tweaking the timing of elections a little so that UK elections now fall on a Tuesday in early November, while universities ensure that students register to vote in the first week of the autumn term, and agree to cancel all classes for two hours between 1 and 3 in the afternoon of polling day. Simple.

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Will the student vote be decisive in Lincoln?

Posted on May 5, 2015 by Andrew Defty

This article first appeared in The Lincolnshire Echo, Thursday April 30 edition.

 

EchoEarlier this week the general election candidates for Lincoln put their case to an audience of students at a hustings held at Bishop Grosseteste University. They will participate in a further debate on the University of Lincoln campus in May.

They are well advised to do so. Lincoln is a marginal seat with a large student population. The Conservatives won in Lincoln in 2010 with a majority of just over 1,000.The University of Lincoln has around 13,000 students while more than 2,000 are studying at Bishop Grosseteste University. Most live within the constituency of Lincoln, which means that students comprise more than 15 per cent of the electorate.

If one bears in mind that the margin of victory in Lincoln in 2010 was 2.3 per cent, it is clear that the student vote has the potential to play a decisive role in the outcome of May’s election in the constituency.

There are, however, a number of factors which may work against the student vote having a significant impact in Lincoln, such as the fact that the 18 to 24 age group is generally less likely to vote than other age-groups, and changes to the method of electoral registration may mean that even fewer students are registered to vote than the 2010 election.

Those Lincoln students who do vote could also choose not to vote in the city; while those studying in Lincoln have a clear interest in the outcome of the election here, some students who have moved to Lincoln to study will prefer to vote in the constituency where they grew up.

Given that Lincoln is an important marginal, those students who want to cast a tactical vote could choose to cast it where it will count the most.

The timing might also have an effect on the turnout in student towns and cities across the UK, as early May is when most students will be in the middle of an examination period. It’s also important to remember that students do not vote as a group; there is in fact no such thing as the “student vote”.

The political affiliation of students varies as it does among the rest of the population. University of Lincoln students have been actively campaigning on behalf of all the main political parties and a number of our graduates are standing for election, including for the Conservatives in Morley and Outwood and in Cleethorpes, and for the Liberal Democrats in Sleaford and North Hykeham.

I have been polling first-year politics students at Lincoln since before the last general election and majority support has switched between Labour and the Conservatives throughout the Parliament.

The only consistent feature has been a decline in support for the Liberal Democrats in the wake of the announcement of increased tuition fees, something which is reflected in national polls of student voting intentions. National polls also indicate that university graduates are less likely to vote UKIP than those who have not been to university, which may be a problem for the party in Lincoln and other cities with a large student population.

It is to be hoped that students in Lincoln vote, and do so in large numbers. The student body has become and active and integral part of the city of Lincoln and they have the potential to be an influential part of the electorate as well.

The reality is that the student vote in Lincoln is unlikely to be decisive in May but it could be, and if students want their voices to be heard, both locally and nationally, they should take this opportunity to get out and vote.

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A New Magna Carta? a student contribution to a select committee inquiry

Posted on April 20, 2015 by Andrew Defty

IMG_1017Earlier this year University of Lincoln students on the first year politics module Who Runs Britain? submitted evidence to a parliamentary select committee inquiry on constitutional reform. The inquiry by the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee was launched shortly after the 2010 general election to look into arguments for and against the adoption of a written, or codified, constitution for the United Kingdom.

The committee published a report in July 2014 entitled A New Magna Carta? in which they set out the arguments for and against codification and provided a blueprint for constitutional change based on three alternative approaches: a constitutional code (a non-legal document setting out the current arrangements); a constitutional consolidation act (a new legislation to bring together existing laws); and a written constitution (a new legal and binding written constitutions for the UK). The committee examined what each of these options might mean in relation to ten key themes: the Head of State; the Prime Minister; elections; ministerial conduct; the House of Lords; the judiciary; human rights; devolution; local government; and the European Union. The report also considered the process by which a constitution would be drafted.

To coincide with the publication of A New Magna Carta? the committee launched a public consultation in which views were sought on the overall question of a written constitution and the three alternative models. In an admirable attempt to involve the public in the parliamentary process the committee sought to elicit views from as wide a range of individuals and groups as possible by producing a short video introduction by the committee Chair, providing advice for schools and universities on giving evidence and running a competition to draft a preamble to a written constitution for the UK.

The ten main themes identified by the committee mapped closely onto the topics covered in the first term of the Who Runs Britain? module, which begins in September with the UK constitution, examines the principal institutions and actors in the British political process the executive, parliament, the judiciary etc. and concludes in December with local government.

However, collating and presenting the views of over fifty undergraduate students, many of whom had not previously studied British politics, was no easy task. A variety of strategies were deployed for capturing views. Students were polled early in the module, and then again towards the end of term, on where they stood on the broad question of whether Britain should adopt a written constitution. A series of workshops were held in order to facilitate more detailed discussion around the proposals included in the committee’s report and to discuss various drafts of our submission.  Three workshops in particular focused on: responses to the broad question of whether Britain should adopt a codified or written constitution; examining the ten main themes identified in the committee’s report; and the process of drafting a new constitutional document.

IMG_1023The key themes were introduced in lectures and the workshops were facilitated by myself and my colleague, Dr Ben Kisby. We provided summaries of the committee’s proposals, background information on the key issues, and guided discussion where necessary. We also drafted the submission. However, the views presented in the submission were entirely those of the students involved, and often did not reflect those of their tutors. At each stage drafts of the submission were circulated and amended on the advice of the students who were quick to point out if the draft was too forceful in making a point or sought to present consensus were there was none. Indeed, it soon became clear that while our tendency in drafting the submission was to seek to present a single coherent and consensual narrative, the students were much more keen to ensure that as diverse a range of views as possible were represented.

The submission can be read in full here. What was clear from the outset was that the overwhelming majority of the students were opposed to the idea of adopting a written constitution, believing that it was unnecessary, a waste of time or simply too difficult. However, when looking in more detail at the key themes, there was support for some codification in certain areas. For example, there was a feeling that the role of the Prime Minister should be more clearly defined, that the status of the Cabinet should be clarified and that the Ministerial code should be enshrined in law. There was also strong support for the view that certain rights, including social and economic rights, should be protected and not easily set aside by a simple majority vote in Parliament.

The Political and Constitutional Reform Committee published its response to the consultation just before Easter. This had been a wide-ranging and innovative consultation on the part of the committee which secured evidence from a more diverse range of participants than normally contribute to select committee inquiries, including individual experts, community groups, universities and schools. There were 161 written submissions of evidence. Lincoln was one of only seven universities whose students made joint submissions to the inquiry, alongside Hull, Manchester Metropolitan, Greenwich, Northumbria, Liverpool and Canterbury Christ Church. In total around 500 students contributed to joint submissions from their departments.

Although the committee’s response did not refer specifically to any of the proposals in our submission, that is the nature of submitting evidence to select committee, the submission was referred to in the report in the context of describing the consultation process. The submission has also been published on the committee’s website. Moreover, the content of our submission was clearly reflected in the committee’s response. In particular the committee gives due prominence to those, like our students, who in general argued against the adoption of a written constitution. For example, in summarising responses it states in paras 32 & 33:

There was a general welcome for the Committee’s exercise… Nevertheless, a number of responses did criticise the premise of the exercise and the necessity of any kind of constitutional codification, praising the flexibility of present constitutional arrangements and arguing that there was no need for change or codification.

Similarly it observed:

We also received submissions arguing that a “constitutional moment” has not been reached, or that political conditions were not right for the introduction of a new constitutional settlement.

And that:

…submissions against codification in general, and a written constitution in particular, argued that the present system was sufficiently flexible and that any form of written constitution would hamper swift and efficient change to the constitution where this was deemed necessary.

The committee’s response also included a draft or ‘pocket constitution’ which reflected some of the more substantive recommendations in our proposal including: that there should be codification of some of the powers of the Prime Minister; that the House of Lords should be significantly smaller; that a single consolidated local government act might more clearly define the powers and functions of local government; and that rights, including social and economic rights, should be entrenched in law.

This was a most valuable process both on the part of the committee and our students who, in their first term at university, worked hard to contribute to a national debate on an issue of national importance. Despite the fact that many of them felt the preferred option was the status quo, they engaged enthusiastically with the process, and welcomed the opportunity to contribute to a parliamentary inquiry. Indeed, while the majority of students were sceptical about the need for a written constitution, due in part to the difficulties of arriving at a national consensus about what it might include, they nevertheless recognised that this consultation and the process whereby we debated it at Lincoln, at least in part showed the potential for broad and inclusive debate on important and complex issues relating to our democracy. For my part, although I have considerable experience of engaging with Parliament, this was the first time I have contributed to a select committee inquiry alongside my students, but I am sure it will not be the last.

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