Is it worth assessing the Government’s progress after 100 days?

Saturday 12th October marked 100 days since the Labour government led by Keir Starmer came to power. This prompted a predictable raft of media reports evaluating the progress of the Labour government in its first 100 days in office. The general consensus is that Labour has struggled to make progress in key policy areas and has often been distracted by having to respond to claims about Cabinet ministers receiving expensive gifts and by changes of personnel in Downing Street. Progress has also been hampered by the time it has taken Labour to bring forward a budget. Without clear spending plans it is difficult to present a clear policy agenda to Parliament or the public. Opinion polling commissioned to mark 100 days indicated that voters are disappointed in the government’s overall performance and  Starmer’s personal approval rating is at the lowest point since he became Labour leader. In a BBC interview, Starmer himself admitted that the Government had been buffeted by ‘sidewinds’ and that being Prime Minister was ‘much tougher than anything I’ve done before’.

Aside from the, far from startling, revelation that being in government is more difficult than opposition, is there any value in judging a government’s performance after only 100 days? It is a nice round number, but 100 days has no political significance. It doesn’t represent the length of a parliamentary session and has no significance in the electoral calendar. Moreover, Labour, wisely, did not seek office by presenting the electorate with a list of things they planned to achieve in the first 100 days.

What is the political context for 100 days?

There is some historical context which perhaps provides some justification for evaluating progress after 100 days of government, but this lies across the Atlantic. Franklin D. Roosevelt became US President in 1933 in the midst of the Great Depression. At his inauguration Roosevelt announced that the country faced such terrible challenges that a special session of Congress would begin immediately and would sit for three months in order to address these problems with some urgency.

There followed an unprecedented period of legislative activity. Congress passed more than 70 Bills, including 15 major pieces of legislation in three months, many of them providing federal emergency relief to those suffering the effects of the economic crisis and in the process expanding, in some cases in perpetuity, the reach and significance of the federal government of the USA.  

Significantly, however, although he instituted this rapid and dramatic expansion of the role of the federal government, Roosevelt did not promise to turn around the country’s fortunes in 100 days. Indeed, he only used the term ‘100 days’ later when referring back to this period.

Can we compare Starmer and Roosevelt’s 100 days?

Roosevelt’s achievements were certainly significant. Whole books have been written on the first 100 days of the first Roosevelt administration. In contrast, as one UK newspaper observed, the first 100 days of Starmer’s premiership will soon be forgotten.

There are however some good reasons why we should not compare the two. The context is obviously different. While Starmer clearly inherited a difficult economic situation, we are not currently living through another Great Depression. Moreover, many of the levers of state support put in place by the Roosevelt administration have existed in the UK for decades, and in some cases were already in place before Roosevelt came to power in the US. Although some might disagree, there is no need for a burst of legislative activity to fundamentally remake the UK welfare state.

Perhaps more significantly, Starmer has had relatively little time to drive forward his legislative agenda. The 73rd Congress of the United States sat in almost continuous session from the day of Roosevelt’s inauguration on 4 March to 15 June 1933. In contrast, the UK general election took place on 4 July, just before Parliament was scheduled to head into its summer recess. Parliament returned on 5th July, but the first six days of the new session were taken up by the swearing in of members. Labour’s term in office began in earnest with the State Opening of Parliament on the 17th July. However, Parliament went into its summer recess ten days later on 30 July. Parliament returned on 2nd September and sat for two weeks (a total of 8 days) before going into a three-week recess for the Party conference season. By the time Labour had reached 100 days in office, Parliament had sat for just 22 days since the State Opening of the new session. There has simply not been enough time to pass significant legislation in that period.

Unsurprisingly not a single Bill has yet been passed by Parliament in the current session. There are currently 66 Bills before Parliament, although the majority of these are Private Members’ Bills which won’t make it onto the statute books. Only 17 Government Bills are currently making their way through Parliament. Some of these are significant but it will be some time before we can evaluate the impact of the Great British Energy Bill, the removal of hereditary peers or the return of the railways to public ownership.

Given the limited opportunities for Government to legislate and Parliament to scrutinise, it is perhaps not surprising that the media have focused so heavily on things taking place beyond Westminster including donations, disagreements at party conference and the Government’s response to the summer riots. There is of course, always something to write about, but the 100 days tag is not a particularly useful milestone against which to measure the progress of the UK Government.

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The 2024 General Election in numbers

The election

Number of seats (constituencies) contested: 650

Number of candidates: 4,515. Considerable higher than 3,327 in 2019.

Average number of candidates per constituency: 6.9. In Northern Ireland 7.6; Scotland 7.4; Wales, 7.3; England 6.9.

Number of constituencies with 10 or more candidates: 27.

Number of MPs standing down: 132 (75 Cons; 34 Lab; 9 SNP; 9 Ind; 3 Sinn Fein; 1 each from Greens and Plaid Cymru).

Constituencies

Number of constituencies in England: 543

Number of constituencies in Scotland: 57

Number of constituencies in Wales: 32

Number of constituencies in Northern Ireland: 18

Number of constituencies which have been subject to boundary changes since 2019: 585

Number of constituencies which have not been subject to boundary changes: 65. Although 4 of these have a new name.

Electoral quota (average number of voters) in each constituency: 73,393. Except for 5 protected island seats.

Number of constituencies with single word names: 152. Down from 206 in the previous parliament.

Number of constituencies with “and” in their title: 250. Up from 161 in the previous parliament.

The results

 VotesVote Share %SeatsNet Gain
Labour9,706,12533.7411+209
Conservative6,827,11223.7121-244
Liberal Democrat3,519,16312.272+61
Scottish National Party724,7582.59-39
Sinn Fein210,9810.770
Democratic Unionist Party172,0580.65-3
Reform UK4,106,66114.35+5
Green Party1,943,2586.74+3
Plaid Cymru194,8110.740
Social Democratic and Labour Party86,8610.32
Traditional Unionist Voice48,6850.21
Alliance117,1910.41
Ulster Unionist Party 0.31 
Workers’ Party of Britain210,1940.70-1
Others/Independent805,1122.86+6

Turnout

Turnout: 60%. Down from 67.3% in 2019. Turnout in 2024 was the second lowest this century, only slightly higher than 59.4% in 2001.

Seat with the highest turnout: Somerset North (76.3%). Where Labour’s Sadik Al-Hassan defeated Cabinet Minister, Liam Fox.

Seat with the lowest turnout: Manchester Rusholme 40%.

Number of seats with a turnout of over 70%: 32

The parties

Candidates fielded by party: Conservatives, 635; Labour, 631; Liberal Democrats, 630; Green, 629; Reform, 609; SNP, 57; Plaid Cymru, 32; Independent, 459; other parties, 518.

Number of parties with candidates standing in more than 600 seats: 5 (Lab, Cons, LD, Green Party, Reform).

Number of parties winning seats: 13. Three more than in 2019, but the same number as immediately prior to the dissolution.

Number of seats Labour won from the Conservatives: 182

Number of seats the Conservatives won from Labour: 1, Leicester East.

Number of seats the Green Party wone from Labour: 1, Bristol Central.

Number of seats Reform UK won from the Conservatives: 5.

Number of seats Labour won from the Scottish National Party: 36

Number of seats the Liberal Democrats won from the Scottish National Party: 3

Third largest party in terms of votes: Reform UK, 4,106,661 votes.

Third largest party in terms of seats: Liberal Democrats, 72 seats.

Number of parties representing constituencies in Scotland: 4 (Labour, 37; SNP, 9; Liberal Democrat, 6; Conservative, 5).

Number of parties representing constituencies in Wales: 3 (Labour, 27; Plaid Cymru, 4; Liberal Democrat 1).

Number of parties representing constituencies in Northern Ireland: 6. Up from 4 in 2019.

Number of seats lost by the Conservatives in Wales: 12

Number of independent candidates winning seats: 6. Up from 0 in 2019 but down from 17 prior to the dissolution of Parliament.

Seat share and vote share

Lowest number of seats ever won by the Conservatives: 121 in 2024. Previous lowest 157 in 1906, and 165 in 1997.

Largest number of seats won by Labour: 419 in 1997, followed by 412 in 2001 and 411 in 2024.

Number of times a party has won more than 400 seats: 6 (1832, 1895, 1900, 1924, 1931, 1997, 2001, 2024)

Share of the vote for parties other than Labour: 66.3%

Share of seats by parties other than Labour: 36.8% (239 seats).

Share of the vote for parties other than Labour and the Conservatives: 42.6%

Share of seats won by parties other than Labour and Conservatives: 18.2% (118 seats)

Number of votes per seat won by Labour: 23,616

Number of votes per seat won by the Conservatives: 56,422

Number of votes per seat won by the Liberal Democrats: 48,877

Number of votes per seat won for Reform UK: 821,332

Largest party share of the vote which did not win any seats: 0.7% (210,194 votes) for the Workers’ Party of Britain.

Majorities, marginals and safe seats

Labour majority: 172. Labour’s second largest majority after 179 in 1997. Largest ever majority was 209 for the Conservatives in 1924.

Seats won by fewer than 100 votes: 7

Smallest majority: 15, Hendon, Labour, David Pinto-Duschinsky.

Largest majority: 21,983, Bootle, Labour, Peter Dowd.

Seats won with more than 50% of the vote: 96

Largest winning share of the vote: 74.3%, Chorley, the seat of The Speaker. Among contested seats 70.6%, Liverpool Walton, Dan Carden, Labour.

Smallest winning share of the vote: 26.7%, Norfolk South West, Labour’s Terry Jermy’s victory over Liz Truss who won 25.3% of the vote.

Members

Number of MPs re-elected: 300

Number of MPs elected for the first time: 335

Number of retreads, MPs returning to Parliament after a gap in service: 15  (including Douglas Alexander, Heidi Alexander, Nick Dakin, Melanie Onn).

Age of oldest MP elected: 80, Sir Roger Gale, Con,  Herne Bay and Sandwich.

Age of youngest MP elected: 22, Sam Carling, Lab, North West Cambridgeshire.

Number of women MPs elected: 263, 40% of the House of Commons. Up from 220 (34%) in 2019.

Number of women MPs by Party: Labour 190; Conservatives, 29; Liberal Democrats, 22.

Proportion of candidates who were women: 31%

Number of MPs from an ethnic minority: 90, 14% of the House of Commons. Up from 66 (10%) in 2019.

Proportion of MPs who were privately educated: 23% compared to 7% of the UK population.

Proportion of MPs who never attended university: 10%

Proportion of MPs who attended Oxford or Cambridge Universities: 20%

Number of University of Lincoln graduates elected: 2. Leigh Ingham (Politics, 2007), Lab, Stafford; Martin Vickers (Politics 2004), Con, Brigg and Immingham.

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This post draws on a number of sources, most notably the BBC general election results, the House of Commons library on boundary changes, candidates, results, the Electoral Reform Society, the Institute for Government on MPs standing down, and Philip Cowley and Matthew Bailey on constituency names.

Any mistakes are mine and happy to correct.

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Why has the Prime Minister chosen to call a general election now?

The ability to choose the timing of a general election is a significant resource in the electoral armoury of a Prime Minister. It allows a Prime Minister to go to the country at a time which is most advantageous when, for example, the opinion polls are favourable, the economy is buoyant, or events (a military victory or national sporting achievement perhaps) have conspired to generate a positive national mood.

It is, however, a diminishing resource. Parliament cannot sit for longer than five years and if a governments enters its final twelve months without holding an election, the opportunities to hold an election can rapidly diminish. If the polls are not supportive or the economic situation is unstable, a government may be forced to hold a general election at a time which is less than advantageous.

There is considerable speculation as to why the Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, has chosen to hold a general election in July but, whatever the reason, this is hardly a shock or snap election. The electoral clock has been running down since the start of the year and the last date on which an election could have been held is 28th January 2025.  

The Prime Minister could have chosen to go to the polls in May to coincide with the local elections which is the customary time for a general election. It is not clear why he did not choose to do so, but many had speculated that once the opportunity for a May election had passed the Prime Minister would go to the country in the Autumn.

However, the room for manoeuvre in the Autumn is relatively limited. An election could not be called until September after Parliament had returned from the summer recess. This would mean an election in mid to late October. Any later would take it beyond the end of British Summer Time. Once the clocks go back, nights begin to draw in and party activists may be less inclined to tramp the streets in search of votes, and voters may be less inclined to answer the door. A November election would probably have meant the Prime Minister would have to endure another party conference. These generally take place in September but can provide a prime opportunity for MPs and party activists to conspire against a leader struggling in the polls.

Moreover, the weather in the Autumn is altogether more unpredictable and few would relish another election in the depths of Winter. If the Prime Minister was tempted to leave it until as late as possible even his most fervent supporters would wish to avoid an election campaign which spanned the Christmas holiday.

In contrast a summer election does not seem entirely unpalatable. Notwithstanding the downpour which accompanied the Prime Minister’s announcement of the election, the weather should be fine in June and July. This will help to encourage party activists to head out onto the doorsteps once again, even if it is only a couple of months after the local elections. It may also encourage turnout, particularly amongst older voters who are more likely to vote Conservative.

The Prime Minister may also be hoping for a poll bounce if England, although perhaps not Scotland, do well in the European Football Championships which begin in mid-June and reach the quarter-final stage the week after the general election.

None of this should obscure the fact that from the government’s perspective this is not an ideal time for a general election. No Prime Minister would want to call a general election when they are twenty points behind in the polls. In fact, a Prime Minister would generally do anything they could to avoid an election in such circumstances. It is clear that many Conservative MPs think the PM should wait, in the hope that the situation improves. The only reason you would not do that is if you genuinely believed the government’s position might get worse.

The fall in the rate of inflation which was announced on the same day as the general election may provide the Prime Minister with a crumb of comfort. Although ironically this good news has been knocked off the front pages by the general election announcement. However, if the government has chosen to pin its hopes for electoral victory on this tentative sign of economic recovery that may be because they do not expect it to be sustained.

The summer may also reveal the weakness of some of the government’s other policies. Most notably its immigration policy. The Prime Minister may have been tempted to wait for the first flight to leave for Rwanda, but it is far from clear when that might be. Moreover, the small number of asylum seekers sent to Rwanda are likely to be eclipsed by the large numbers who will almost inevitably arrive on the South Coast in small boats across the summer months.

The simple fact is, no matter how bad the current situation is for the government, with barely six months to go before he is forced to call an election, the Prime Minister may well have calculated that this is as good as it gets. It is hard to disagree.

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What are the implications of having the Foreign Secretary sitting in the House of Lords?

The most surprising aspect of Rishi Sunak’s Cabinet reshuffle has been the appointment of the former Prime Minister, David Cameron, as Foreign Secretary. Cameron is no longer an MP and as it is a convention that government ministers sit in Parliament, he has accepted a seat in the House of Lords in order to enable him to take on the role.

Cameron’s appointment raises a number of interesting questions: about the ministerial career of former Prime Ministers; the appointment of Cabinet ministers from the House of Lords; and the implications of this for parliamentary scrutiny.

The political career of former Prime Ministers

David Cameron’s return to front line politics with a seat in the Cabinet is by no means unique but is relatively unusual. As has been widely reported, the last former Prime Minister to take a Cabinet post after leaving office was Alec Douglas-Hume, Conservative Prime Minister from 1963 to 1964, who served as Foreign Secretary under Edward Heath, from 1970 to 1974. Interestingly, Douglas-Hume had previously served as Foreign Secretary while sitting in the House of Lords before becoming Prime Minister. He gave up his seat in the Lords in 1963 in order to become Prime Minister, and for his second term as Foreign Secretary he sat in the House of Commons as the MP for Perth and Kinross.

Other former Prime Ministers who have taken on Cabinet roles after leaving office include Arthur Balfour, Prime Minister from 1902 to 1905, who went on to serve as Foreign Secretary, from 1916 to 1919 in the wartime administration of Lloyd George. Ramsay MacDonald and Neville Chamberlain were both given the opportunity to remain in the Cabinet after stepping down as Prime Minister, with the largely honorary role of Lord President of the Council. Although in Chamberlain’s case this was for only a short period until his death in October 1940. 

In recent years, however, there has been a tendency for Prime Ministers to leave parliament completely shortly after leaving office. John Major, Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and most recently Boris Johnson all announced they were leaving the House of Commons shortly after the end of their premiership. Cameron’s appointment to the House of Lords is also relatively unusual. Although it had until recently been customary for former Prime Ministers to accept a seat in the House of Lords, Margaret Thatcher was the last former Prime Minister to do so. Of the seven former Prime Ministers currently alive, Cameron will be the only one sitting in the House of Lords, although two, Theresa May and Liz Truss, continue to sit in the House of Commons.

Why has David Cameron been given a seat in the House of Lords?

In order to enable David Cameron to be appointed to the Cabinet, Rishi Sunak has given him a seat in the House of Lords. Although there is no legal requirement for government ministers to sit in Parliament, it is a very strongly held convention. This is based on the principle that ministers must be directly accountable to Parliament and only members may answer questions on the floor of the House of Commons or the House of Lords.

It has been argued that the convention that ministers must be sitting members of Parliament limits the pool of individuals the Prime Minister can draw upon when making ministerial appointments. In a number of other states, ministers can be appointed from outside the legislature which arguably allows for a wider range of talented individuals to be drawn into the government. In the UK, a Prime Minister who wishes to make a ministerial appointment from outside Parliament does have the option of making someone a member of the House of Lords in order to make them available for ministerial office.

This practice is not particularly unusual. Gordon Brown made a number of direct ministerial appointments to the House of Lords including the former MP, Peter Mandelson, who left the Commons in 2004 but was elevated to the Lords in 2008 in order to become Secretary of State for Business, and Andrew Adonis who was appointed to the Lords in order to become a minister in the Department for Education and Skills. David Cameron himself appointed several business leaders to the House of Lords in order to give them ministerial roles, including Stephen Green, the former group chairman of HSBC and Ian Livingston, the former chief executive of BT. More recently, in 2021 the UK’s former chief negotiator for exiting the European Union, David Frost, was made a peer by Boris Johnson, and appointed as Minister of State in the Cabinet Office with responsibility for Brexit.

An alternative approach could have been to find a safe seat for David Cameron which would have allowed him to return to Parliament as a member of the House of Commons.  This would, however, be dependent on a safe seat being made available, possibly by an MP who was already planning to stand down at the next election. This may also have been a decidedly risky strategy given that the government has recently lost several by-elections in supposedly safe seats. In 1964, Patrick Gordon Walker was appointed as Foreign Secretary by Harold Wilson despite having lost his seat in the 1964 general election. He subsequently resigned after losing a by-election in a supposedly safe Labour seat. Moreover, while Cameron may be happy to take on the role of Foreign Secretary, he may not have been prepared to return to the day-to-day grind of fighting an election and being a constituency MP. 

While it is not particularly unusual for governments to make appointments to the House of Lords in order to allow individuals to become ministers, it is relatively rare for members of the House of Lords to hold such senior ministerial office. There are usually somewhere between twenty and thirty ministers in the House of Lords, compared to around eighty in the House of Commons. Governments need to appoint ministers in the Lords to enable someone to speak in the upper House on behalf of each government department, but ministers in the Lords tend to hold more junior ministerial positions, as Ministers of State or Parliamentary Under-Secretaries. In recent years, the only member of the upper House who has routinely sat in the Cabinet is the Leader of the House of Lords.

This was not always the case. Up until the end of the nineteenth century it was common practice for Cabinet ministers, including the Prime Minister to sit in the Lords. The last Prime Minister to sit in the Lords was Lord Salisbury who left office in 1902, although the practice of appointing Foreign Secretaries from the upper House continued well into the twentieth century. Lord Curzon was Conservative Foreign Secretary from 1919 to 1924 and was widely expected to succeed Andrew Bonar Law as Prime Minister in 1923. He lost out to Stanley Baldwin in part because it was felt the Prime Minister should sit in the Commons. Lord Halifax was Foreign Secretary at the outbreak of the Second World War and, as noted above, the Earl of Home, was Foreign Secretary before renouncing his title, perhaps mindful of Curzon’s difficulties, to become Prime Minister in 1963. The last Foreign Secretary to be appointed from the House of Lords was Lord Carrington, who held the post from Thatcher’s election in 1979 until his resignation following the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982.

What are the implications of the Foreign Secretary sitting in the House of Lords?

Lord Carrington’s experience is perhaps revealing of the difficulties Lord Cameron could face. With Carrington unable to answer questions in the House of Commons, answering Foreign Office questions in the Commons was delegated to two junior ministers. In most circumstances this worked admirably well, but when the Falklands crisis erupted, MPs in the House of Commons did not conceal their anger at their inability to question the Foreign Secretary directly. In addition to being accountable to Parliament for their department, senior ministers play an important role in defending the government and the Prime Minister. Lord Carrington’s inability to provide the kind of support the PM needed in the House of Commons contributed to his decision to resign. Lord Cameron may be a useful and experienced ally to the Prime Minister in public and in the media but there is little he can do if things get sticky in the House of Commons.

Cameron’s appointment also means that there is real concern about the impact on parliamentary scrutiny of having the Foreign Secretary sitting in the Lords. The Foreign Secretary will not be available to answer departmental questions in the Commons, which come around about once a month. Nor will he be available to answer urgent questions, which are much more common now than they were when Lord Carrington was Foreign Secretary. In particular, if there is a major international incident which threatens international security or UK interests, the government’s response in the House of Commons will be provided by a more junior minister, who quite possibly does not attend Cabinet. Alternately if the situation is particularly grave, the Prime Minister may find himself delegating for the Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons. Which may appease the Commons but won’t make life easier for the Prime Minister.

The Speaker of the House of Commons was quick to make a statement about the need to ensure that parliamentary scrutiny of foreign policy is not undermined by Lord Cameron’s appointment:

[G]iven the gravity of the current international situation, it is especially important that this House is able to scrutinise the work of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office effectively. I have therefore commissioned advice from the Clerks about possible options for enhancing scrutiny of the work of the Foreign Secretary when that post is filled by a Member of the other House. I also look forward to hearing the Government’s proposals on how the Foreign Secretary will be properly accountable to this House. 

On the other hand, the Foreign Secretary will not avoid parliamentary scrutiny altogether. The House of Lords is likely to institute its own mechanism to provide regular questions to the Foreign Secretary. Moreover, there is considerable expertise in foreign affairs in the Lords, including several former permanent secretaries from the Foreign Office. As a new peer, Cameron will also be unfamiliar with the practices of the second chamber and will quickly realise that he cannot rely on the same level of support in the chamber as he once enjoyed in the more partisan House of Commons.

The Foreign Secretary will also not entirely avoid scrutiny by MPs. Although he can’t appear to answer questions in the chamber of the House of Commons, members of the House of Lords can appear before House of Commons select committees. He is likely to be much in demand from the House of Commons select committee on foreign affairs, as well as a number of joint committees which comprise members from both Houses, most notably the joint committees on human rights and national security and the Intelligence and Security Committee.

As a former Prime Minister, David Cameron is an experienced parliamentarian, but his ministerial experience is confined to that of being Prime Minister. He may find the role of Foreign Secretary and the demands of adapting to scrutiny in the House of Lords particularly demanding. It is also possible that the absence of a Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons may place increased demands on the government and even the Prime Minister himself. Both will be hoping that the benefits outweigh the undoubted challenges ahead.

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How did the Prime Minister win a vote in Parliament and lose her authority?

It is remarkable that after a series of U-turns on key policy announcements and the resignation of two senior members of her Cabinet, the event which may well have precipitated the Prime Minister’s resignation was a parliamentary vote on an opposition motion which the Government actually won.

To be sure, many would argue that the Prime Minister’s position was already untenable before Wednesday evening but any hopes of retaining office went downhill quickly following the chaotic mismanagement of a vote on a Labour motion on fracking. While the Labour Party may take some pleasure in contributing to PM’s downfall, much of the damage was self-inflicted.

What is an opposition day debate?

Wednesday was one of twenty afternoons set aside in each parliamentary session to debate issues raised by opposition parties. Although so-called opposition days allow the opposition to set the agenda, they rarely cause serious difficulties for a government which can command a majority in the House of Commons. A government with a majority can usually be assured of defeating an opposition motion. Moreover, even if the government loses a vote on an opposition day motion, in most cases these are not considered to be binding and the government is not obliged to make any changes in response. Consequently, government’s may even choose to ignore an opposition motion entirely and not bother voting at all. Opposition days do provide an important opportunity for opposition parties to raise issues of concern and possibly to embarrass the government by forcing its MPs to vote against something which may be popular, such as extending free school meals, but can’t generally be used to force the government to take action.

Labour’s motion on fracking was slightly different in that it included a clause which would set aside the standing orders of the House of Commons, which state that the government has control over parliamentary business. The motion then allowed for the opposition to take control of the parliamentary order paper at a later date (29th November) in order to bring forward a bill which would ban the use of fracking in the UK. This was an unusual tactic but reflects a similar episode during the Brexit debates in 2019, when a group of MPs took control of the parliamentary agenda in order to bring forward a bill to prevent a no-deal Brexit.

This was an interesting tactic by Labour, facilitating a parliamentary vote on the standing orders which can be changed by a vote in the House, rather than seeking to press the government to take action without any real power to compel it to do so. As a result, the opposition sought to turn a non-binding opposition motion into a resolution with real effects. This meant the government could not afford simply to ignore the opposition motion and cede control of the legislative agenda to Labour.

Moreover, Labour’s decision to focus on fracking was also key. The Prime Minister had proposed lifting the ban on fracking, but this is an issue on which Conservative MPs are divided. Not only was a moratorium on fracking included in the party’s 2019 manifesto, but several Conservative MPs  represent constituencies where plans for fracking have been subject to considerable local opposition. In short Labour sought to force Conservative MPs to vote against a key manifesto pledge and in favour of something which many of them oppose. By combining this with an attempt to take control of the parliamentary agenda, Labour effectively forced the government into a position in which it felt the need to whip its MPs to vote against the motion.

Three-line whips and confidence motions

While Labour might be seen to have laid a trap for the government, the chaos which followed was largely self-inflicted. The Conservative response was to issue a three-line whip, effectively compelling Conservative MPs to vote against the opposition motion or be subject to disciplinary action. Given the size of the government’s majority this should have been enough to defeat the motion. It is possible that several Conservative MPs would have abstained, some may even have decided to vote for the Labour motion, although this seems unlikely. Although this is a serious disciplinary matter, as several commentators have since observed, the penalty for abstaining on a three-line whip is unlikely to have extended to having the whip withdrawn and, if the MPs in question had particular constituency concerns, the government would usually have been sympathetic to their predicament.

However, at some point on Wednesday, the Government decided to make this a confidence motion, implying that if the government was defeated it would be forced to resign and call a general election. Although set piece votes, such as those on the Queen’s speech or the budget are generally considered to be confidence issues which the government must win, the government can declare any vote a matter of confidence. It was, however, a considerable escalation of the stakes to make a vote on an opposition motion on such a divisive issue a confidence vote.

Ironically opposition days can be used to table motions of no confidence in the government and unlike most opposition day motions these are considered binding. Given the difficulties facing the Truss government Labour may well have considered this, but perhaps dismissed the idea on the grounds that a confidence motion was more likely to unite Conservative MPs around their leader. By choosing to turn a vote on which its MPs are divided into a confidence vote, the Conservative leadership, however, managed to create a level of disruption which the Labour opposition could not hope to have achieved simply by tabling a confidence motion. MPs who might reasonably be allowed to quietly abstain on an issue which was particularly sensitive in their constituencies, were now being asked to put their own re-election chances on the line to prop up the Prime Minister.

It is not clear why the government chose to do this. One must assume that Conservative whips felt that a three-line whip was not enough to ensure victory and there was a real danger that Labour would win the vote. It is also worth considering the wider implications of a Labour victory. If Labour had been successful in seizing the agenda and bringing forward its own legislation on this issue, it might well have repeated the trick on subsequent opposition days, significantly disrupting the government’s own legislative agenda.

It’s hard to know what intelligence Conservative whips had about the scale of the potential backbench rebellion on the Labour motion but there is very little evidence that a sizeable and damaging rebellion was impending. On Wednesday afternoon less than a handful of Conservative MPs publicly stated that they could not vote with the government on this motion, and most of the dismay on Conservative benches revolved around the fact that the government had chosen to make this a confidence issue.

Confusion in the chamber and in scuffles in the lobby

The government’s problems were compounded by the handling of the issue as the day progressed. Having decided to make this already divisive issue the one on which the Truss government would survive or fall, someone in number 10 got cold feet and decided not to risk it. The minister closing the debate at the despatch box, Graham Stuart, dismayed the House by stating that ‘quite clearly, this is not a confidence vote’, repeating ‘obviously this is not a confidence vote’. Stuart was asked to clarify this by the Conservative MP, Ruth Edwards, who stated ‘many of us have been told today by our Whips that if we vote for, or abstain from voting against, this motion, we will lose the Whip.’ His response, ‘that is a matter for party managers, and I am not a party manager’ was hardly a lesson in clarity.

The effect of this was twofold. There was clearly some confusion as to whether this was a confidence issue. Stuart’s initial statement that it was not a confidence issue was arguably clear, but his follow up did little to settle the matter, particularly for MPs who had been told all day by the whips, presumably in the most robust terms, that they must vote with the government to prevent a general election. Secondly, it is apparent that this last-minute change had not been communicated to the whips, effectively undermining their authority. As Conservative MPs made their way into the division lobbies there were reports that the chief whip and the deputy chief whip had both resigned, and for several hours afterwards the government was unable to confirm if either were still in place.

There were also reports of an unseemly row between Conservative MPs in the division lobby. A groups of Conservative MPs, including cabinet members, were accused of physically manhandling at least one reluctant Conservative MP into the lobby in support of the government, prompting the speaker to launch an investigation into bullying.

To compound the confusion, in the commotion in the division lobbies it is apparent that several MPs failed to record their vote using the electronic card readers when entering the lobbies. For a time it appeared that the Conservative rebellion was even greater than it eventually proved to be, and perhaps most remarkably, that the Prime Minister had not voted.

In the end the Conservatives won the vote with some ease. The Labour motion was defeated, it was later announced that the whips had not resigned, and the record was corrected to show that the Prime Minister had voted with most of the rest of her party. Thirty-two Conservative MPs abstained, although some of these will have had permission to miss the vote and will presumably have been paired with an opposition MP who was also missing.  In a bizarre coda at 1.30 in the morning Downing Street issued a statement that although the vote had not been a confidence issue, it had still been a three-line whip and those who did not have a reasonable excuse for their absence would face ‘proportionate disciplinary action.’ It is not clear if this process had begun by the time the Prime Minister resigned twelve hours later.

With its fracking motion Labour presented the government with a knotty problem, which certainly required careful handling. Instead, the government contrived to alienate its own embattled backbenchers by selecting the nuclear option and making it a confidence vote. It then further alienated them by changing its position only minutes before the vote took place. The melee in the division lobby only added to the sense of confusion and lack of control at the heart of government. That the government won the vote is largely irrelevant, as in the process it lost what remaining credibility it had amongst its own MPs. The episode is a remarkable example of the importance of party management in the House of Commons and that opposition parties do not necessarily need to win a parliamentary vote in order to undermine the government.

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